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THE DETERMINATION OF THE UNION STATUS OF WORKERS
ABSTRACT
A model of the determination of the union status of workers is de-
veloped that incorporates the separate decisions of workers and potential
union employers in a framework which recognizes the possibility of an excess
supply of workers for existing union jobs.This theoretical framework re-
sults in an empirical problem of partial observability because information on
union status is not sufficient to determine whether nonunion workers are
nonunion because they do not desire union representation or because they were
not hired by union employers despite a preference for union representation.
The problem is solved by using data from the Quality of Employment Survey
that have a unique piece of information on worker preferences which allows
identification and estimation of the model.
The empirical results yield some interesting insights into the process
of union status determination that cannot be gained from a simple logit or
probit analysis of unionization. Chief among these relate to the unioniza-
tion of nonwhites and southerners.The well—known fact that nonwhites are
more likely to be unionized than otherwise equivalent whites is found largely
to be due to a greater demand for union representation on the part of non-
white workers. The equally well—known lower propensity to be unionized among
southern workers is found to be due to a combination of a lower demand for
union representation on the part of southern workers and a supply of union
jobs which is more constrained relative to demand than in the North.
Henry S. Farber
Department of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA. 02139
(617) 253—2678—1- Henry S. Farber
1.INTRODUCTION
A source of muchconfusionin the analysis of labor unions regards the
process by which the union status of workers is determined. In most cases
the union status of individual workers has been modeled as being the result
solely of utility maximizing decisions by workers. (See, for example,
Ashenfelter and Johnson [2], Lee [12] and Schmidt and Strauss [18]). On the
other hand, it has been argued that any real effect of unions on compensation
or other aspects of employment could be partially or even completely offset
by union employers' ability to hire better workers. This argument, that
union workers might be "better" than observationally equivalent nonunion
workers, has led to the recent outpouring of research attempting to measure
the "true' effect of unions in the United States.2 It is clear that union
employers must have some control over whom they hire in order for the true
effect of unions to be offset by this mechanism, and such employer control is
not consistent with the worker choice model of union status. Indeed, it is a
major weakness of this literature that either a worker choice model or no
exp)icit model is offered while the implicit reasoning suggests that
employers are making relevant decisions. Given the centrality to these
analyses of the process by which union status is determined, one must
question any conclusions which are drawn in this context.
In this study it is argued that the union status of workers is
determined as the result of separate decisions by workers and potential union
employers. Workers decide whether they would prefer union or nonunion jobs
based on the utilities that these jobs yield to them. At the same time,
union employers are deciding which of the workers who want union jobs to hire-2- Henry S. Farber
given that workers differ in their productive characteristics and that these
characteristics are compensated differently in the union and nonunion
sectors. Essentially union employers are assumed to hire the workers who
enable them to produce at minimum cost.
The presumption that union employers have some discretion in hiring
results from the likelihood of queues for vacancies in existing union jobs.3
These queues result from the facts that it is unlikely that dues and
initiation fees completely offset the advantages of unionization for all
workers and that it is expensive to create new union jobs by organizing
nonunion jobs. More fundamentally, the queues result from a distinction,
arising from the process of unioniztion, which must be drawn between the
union status of workers and the union status of jobs. Nonunion jobs become
unionized through organization of the workers who hold them. This is a
costly and uncertain process which can involve the holding of an election
supervised by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).5 These elections
are often preceded by intense and closely monitored campaigns, and they may
involve appeals r either or both sides to the NLRB regarding such issues as
illegal campaign tactics and determination of the appropriate bargaining
unit. However, once the jobs are successfully unionized, their union status
is preserved even if the workers who made the investment in organization
leave.6 In addition, new jobs created through expansion of unionized
establishments are unionized by definition. Union employers can hire
whomever they wish to fill any vacancies, but all new hirees will be
unionized.7 Thus, unless dues or initiation fees are sufficiently large,
there will be workers who desire vacancies in existing union jobs but who are
not willing to undertake investment in new unionization. For these iorkers-3- Henry S. Farber
the benefits of unionization are larger than the costs of union membership
but smaller than the costs of organizing nonunion jobs. The results are
queues for union jobs.
In general, empirical analysis of a model of the determination of the
unionstatusof workers of the sort proposed here is hampered by the fact
that only the outcome (union status) is observed so that it is impossible to
discern whether nonunion workers did not desire union representation
or desired union representation but were not selected from the queue by a
union employer. Abowd and Farber [i] carry out with some success an
empirical analysis of union status determination which is consistent with a
queuing model, but they are hampered by just this partial observability
problem. Poirier [14] presents an econometric approach to identification and
estimation of such models. Unfortunately, his technique is heavily dependent
on functional form for identification and to date has not proven very useful
in applications. More successful are studies which use data from such
sources as the Quality of Employment Survey (QES) and surveys of workers
,erticipating in NLRB-supervised reiresentation elections to focus on worker
preferences for union representation as distinct from actual union status.
These include studies by Farber and Saks [8] and Farber [6,7]. The drawback
of these studies is that they can shed no light on employer selection
criteria, and as a result they cannot address the full question of the
determination of the union status of workers.
The approach to estimation taken in this study is to utilize data from
the QES on both the union status of workers and on the explicit preferences
of nonunion workers for union representation. The crucial bit of information
is the response elicited from nonunion workers as to whether or not they-4- Henry S. Farber
would vote for union representation on their current job were a secret ballot
election to be held. While these data present some problems of their own, it
is argued below that they provide enough information to allow identification
of the queue and estimation of the full model of union status determination
including both worker and employer decision criteria.
In the next section an explicit model of the determination of the union
status of workers conditional on the locus of union jobs, incorporating both
the worker and potential union employers as decision makers, is developed.
Econometrically, the model is bivariate in nature which reflects the fact
that there are two decision makers.
In Section III the data from the QES and the econometric framework are
discussed. Particular attention is paid to the interpretation of the crucial
question regarding nonunion worker preferences for union representation in
the context of the problem of interest here. The data are censored with
regard to this variable pn the basis of the process of union status
determination modeled in the previous section. It is argued that the
ceroedQES inforsiation reflects current preferences for union
representationwhile the model suggeststhat union status is a reflectionof
preferencesfor union representation at the time the worker began his current
job. It is further argued that the structure of the workers' preference
function for union representation does not change over time and that actual
preferences will differ over time only to the extent that the measured and
unmeasured characteristics of workers or their jobs change. In other words,
age or seniority will vary over time and affect worker preferences, but the
effect of a given level of age or seniority on preferences will not vary over
time. In addition, unmeasured factors such as on-the—job relationships with-5- Henry S. Farber
co—workers or supervisors and unobserved factors which affect compensation
can vary over time resulting in changes in preferences. An econometric
framework which exploits this fixity of structure while accounting for the
censored nature of the data is developed. Section IV contains the empirical
analysis of the resulting trivariate discrete data model.
In Section V the substantive results are discussed in the context of the
theoretical framework derived in Section II. Important insights into well
known relationships between union status and such characteristics as race,
region, occupation, and age are gained from the results through the
decomposition of these relationships separately into components due to
workers and to employers. For example, it is found that the low probability
of working on union jobs for southern workers is the result of a combination
of a somewhat lower worker demand for union representation combined with a
supply of union jobs which is more constrained relative to demand than in the
North. On the other hand, the relatively high probability for nonwhite
workers of working on union jobs, even after standardizing for education and
ocrwpation, i found largely to h due to a substautially higher demand for
union representation among nonwhite workers.
The final section contains a summary of the results along with a
discussion of their implications both with regard to the process of
unionization and with regard to analysis of the "true" effects of labor
unions.
II. A MODEL OF UNION STATUS DETERMINATION
The determination of the union status of workers is the result of
decisions made separately by workers and union employers. Essentially, a—6- Henry S. Farber
worker will be unionized only if he both wants a union job and is hired by a
union employer. It is assumed that the workers make their decisions
regarding preference for union representation based on the relative
utilities derived from union and nonunion employment. In addition, it is
assumed that employers decide which workers to hire based on a comparison of
the unit costs of effective (productivity adjusted) labor input yielded by
different workers.
The decision of an individual worker to desire union representation is
based on a comparison of the worker's utilities in the union and nonunion
sectors. The worker will desire employment in the sector which yields the
highest level of satisfaction. More formally, if M represents the difference
between the worker's utility on a union job and his utility on a nonunion job
then the criterion for the worker to desire union representation is that M>O.
Given that workers are heterogeneous in their preference for union
representation to the extent that workers of different characteristics derive
different amounts of pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefit from unionization, N
will iiry acros[ workers. A coiwenit parEmeteriation for th worker
preference criterion as a function of individual characteristics is
(1) MXG1+u1
where X is a vector of observable individual characteristics, G1 is a
parameter vector, and u1 represents unobservable individual characteristics
which affect worker preference for union representation.8
The union employer decision criterion regarding which workers to hire is
the result of a comparison by the employer of the relative cost of
"producing" effective labor using workers of differing characteristics and
hence differing productivities. The cost of producing effective labor in the-7- Henry S. Farber
union sector will vary with worker characteristics as long as compensation
differentials in the union sector do not accurately reflect productivity
differentials, and since compensation in the union sector are set through the
collective bargaining process there is no reason to expect compensation and
productivity to be so precisely related.9 Given that union employers are
cost minimizing producers of output, they will wish to hire those workers who
enable them to produce effective labor, and hence output, most cheaply. The
structure of compensation in the union sector relative to productivity
combined with the distribution of workers who desire union representation
relative to the supply of unionized jobs defines a threshold level of
effective labor cost which represents the maximutu that union employers will
be willing to pay for effective labor. In this context an individual worker
will be hired by a union employer only if his effective labor cost in the
union sector is less than this threshold.
In more formal terms, the criterion for a union employer in a given
geographic or occupational labor market to hire a particular worker is that
thE. union effectii: labor ccst of That worker (C) be smaller than the
treshold (K) in that labor market. LetHC-Krepresent the difference
between union effective labor cost and the threshold so that the union
employer criterion for hiring a particular worker is that H<O. A convenient






where G2 represents a vector of parameters andu2 represents unobservable
individual characteristics which affect the employer decision process. The-8-- Henry S. Farber
factors which affect H reflect variation in the supply of union jobs across
different labor goeraphic and occupational labor markets as well as
variation in effective labor cost of different workers.
The unobserved components of the model (u1 and u2) can be assumed to be
random varIables which may be correlated for any particular individual but
are distributed independently across different individuals. These random





Inorder to understand how the model can be implemented, it is useful to
express foinallj ha(. can b inferred from data on UnOIIstauualone, If a
worker reports that he is working on a union job then it can be inferred
that at the time he took the job he both desired a union job and was hired by
a union employer. Alternatively, if a worker reports that he is working on a
nonunion job then it can be inferred that at the time he started the job he
either desired a union job but was not hired by a union employer or he did
not desire a union job. However, for neither union nor nonunion workers can
this information be used to make inferences about current preferences for
union representation or current ability to be hired by a union employer.
Consider the following examples. First regarding the preferences of union
workers, it is possible that a union worker may no longer desire union
representation but not be willing to quit his union job and sacrifice the
nonportable benefits of seniority in order to take a nonunion job. A similar-9- Henry S. Farber
argument can be made concerning the preferences of nonunion workers. Next
regarding the ability of nonunion workers to be hired by a union employer, a
nonunion worker who desired a union job but was not hired by a union employer
at the time he started his current job may now be able to be hired by a union
employer but not be willing to sacrifice his nonunion seniority to take a
union job. These examples suggest that both worker and employer decisions
can change over time and that inferences based on the union status of workers
must be restricted to preferences of workers and employers at the time of
hire.
In the context of the model developed here, the probability that a
worker is observed in a union job is the joint probability that he desired a
union job at the time of hire (M0 > 0) and he was hired by a union employer
(H0 < 0). The "j"subscriptdenotes that the relevant quantities are
measured at the time of hire. On this basis, the probability of observing a
worker on a union job is written in terms of the random variables as
(4) Pr(U1) =Pr(u1> X0G1, u2 < -X0G2).
Similarly, the probability of observing a worker in a nonunion job is
1 —Pr(U=1),which can be expressed as
(5) Pr(U0) =Pr(u1> —X0G1, u2 > —x0a2) +Pr(u1< —X0G1)
where the first term represents the probability that the worker desired a
union job at the time he took his current job but was not hired by a union
employer while the second term represents the probability that the worker did
not desire a union job at the time he took his current job. The exogenous
variables are time—subscripted to reflect conditions at the start of the jobs-10- Henry S. Farber
and the random components (u1 and u2), while not subscripted, are considered
to be specific to the time of hire. The crucial point to note is that the
structural parameters (C1 and G2) are not time-subscripted and are assumed to
be stable over time.
In order to implement the model a functional form must be selected for
the random variables. Therefore, it is assumed that v1 and v2 are
distributed as bivariate normal with zero mean and covariance matrix as
defined in equation (3). Not all of the parameters of the covariance matrix
errors (v) are estimable. Due to its discrete choice nature, the model is
identified only up to the ratio of the parameter vectors to the standard
deviations of their respective errors. For this reason the variances of u1
and U2arenormalized to one. Thus, the only element of the covariance
matrix which is estimable is the correlation between the reduced form errors
In addition, the probabilities in equations (4) and (5) become
standardized normal probabilities.
The model is theoretically identified and can be estimated using data on
union status alone w}ere the prohbi1ity of a worker being unionized is
defined as Pr(U=1) in equation (4). However, the two distinct elements in
Pr(U=0) in equation (5) highlight the fundamental partial observability
problem which stems from not knowing whether nonunion workers are nonunion
because they desired a union job but were not hired by a union employer or
because they did not desire a union job. Poirier [14] discusses estimation
of partial observability bivariate probit models of this sort and argues that
the model is identified and estimable. However, identification relies
heavily on nonlinearities in the functional forn of the probability
distribution, and this is not terribly satisfactory. In addition, some
experience with estimation of partial observability models in this context—11- Henry S. Farber
suggests that there are convergence problems and that where convergence is
reached the parameters are not estimated with useful precision.11 In view of
these factors, the empirical analysis proceeds using a different approach:
additionalinformation on workerpreferences, available from the Quality of
EmploymentSurvey,is used toaid in the identification and estimation ofthe
model. Thediscussionturnsnowtoa description of the data and the
developmentof the appropriate econometric framework for estimation of the
model utilizing the auxiliary information on worker preferences.
III. THE DATA AND ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
Thedata used are from the 1977 cross-section of the Quality of
Employment Survey (QES) developed by the Survey Research Center of the
University of Michigan. The QES contains data for approximately 1500
randomly selected workers (both union and nonunion) on their personal
characteristics and job attributes.12 The particular sample for use in this
study was derived from the QES by selecting those workers for whom the survey
contained valid information on thevariableslisted in Table I. Self—
employed workers, managers, sales workers, and construction workers were
deleted from the sample due to the fact that the union status of these
workers is determined by a different process than that outlined in the
previous section. For example, self—employed workers will not be unionized
by definition, while union employment in the construction industry is
characterized by hiring halls where the union effectively makes the hiring
decisions for employers. The remaining sample contains915 workers. Table I
containsdescriptions of the variables used in the study as wellas their
meansand standard deviations for the entire sample and the union and
nonunion subsamples. The base group for the dichotomous variables consistsTABLE I
Means (Standard Deviations) of Data













U =1if works on union job .368 —— ——
VFU =1if desires union represent. —- -- .370
Age age in years 36.8 38.2 35.9
C
(13.1) (12.6) (13.3)
Sen firm seniority in years 6.90 9.48 5.40
C
(v.49) (8.18) (6.60)
Age Age -Sen 29.9 28.7 30.5 0 C C
(10.8) (9.28) (11.5)
Fe =1if female .419 .329 .471
Marr =1ifmarried w/spouse present .640 .709 .600
Marr*Fe =1ifFe =1and Marr =1 .198 .181 .208
=1if nonwhite .137 .160 .123
South =1if worker resides in South .353 .237 .420
Ed < 12 =if <12 yearseducation .223 .258 .202
Ed.12 =iif =12years education .364 .374 .358
12<Ed<16=1if >12 years& <16 years educ. .212 .166 .239
Ed16 =1if 16 years education .201 .202 .201
Blue =1if occupation is blue collar .415 .564 .317
Cler =1if occupation is clerical .205 .116 .258
Serv =1if occupation is service .156 .119 .178
Prof&Tech =1if occupationis professional .234 .211 .247
or technical-12- Henry S. Farber
of white, nonsouthern, unmarried, male, blue collar workers with twelveyears
of education. On average, the 37 percent of the sample who are unionized are
slightly older and are more likely to be male, married, nonwhite,
nonsouthern, and in a blue collar occupation. Unionization is defined as
working on a job which is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. This
is appropriate in light of the fact that it is collective bargaining as
opposed to union membership which alters the employment relationship.
The crucial bits of information for this study are data on the union
status of the jobs held by the individuals and the response to the question
asked only of nonunion workers, "If an election were held with secret
ballots, would you vote for or against having a union or employee association
represent you?". This latter variable, called VFU, is the piece of
information which is unique to this data set, and it will serve as the basis
for identification of the queue for union jobs. it is interpreted hereas
the current preference of a worker for union representation on his current
job. Thus, it holds all job characteristics fixed, including seniority,
excep those whic" the wcrk€r expes the union to affect. Fully 7 percent
of the nonunion sample answered this question in the affirmative so that
there is substantial variation in the response.
It was noted in the previous section that the partial observability
problem is the cause of difficulty in identifying and estimating the model
strictly from data on union status. The information on VFU can be used to
solve this problem in a rather straightforward fashion. It is argued that
the probability that a worker currently desires union representation on his
job (Pr(VFU=1)) is a result of the same decision calculus derived in the
previous section. This probability is Pr(M0 > 0) where the subscript "c"




and the probability that a worker currently desires union representation is
(7) Pr(VFU1)Pr(u3 >
whereX
represents the exogenous variables measured at the current time and
u3 represents the random component in the worker preference function measured
at the current time.13
If the data on VFU were available for all workers it would be
straightforward to estimate G1 from a simple probit likelihood function
derived from equation (7) under the assumption that u3 was normally
distributed. However, data on VFU are available only for nonunion workers so
that the data are censored on the basis of a variable which is obviously
related. The standard approach to estimating a censored data model is to
specify the censoring process along with the joint stochastic structure of
the censored and censoring processes. The model can then be estimated
jointly using maximum likelihood techniques. In the case at hand, the
censoring process is the model of union status determination derived in
section II and expressed probabilistically in eouations (4) and (5).
Assuming that u3 is distributed as standard normal and using the earlier
assumption regarding the joint normality of u1 and u2, the implication is





where the variances are normalized to one as required for identification of-14- Henry S. Farber
this class of discrete data models and wherep represents the correlation
between u. and u.. 1 3
Three distinct events are possible in this framewOrk. The first is that
the worker is unionized, in which case there is no information regarding
current preferences for union representation. The probability of this event
is the probability that at the time the worker started his union job he
desired a union job (N0 > 0) and he was hired by a union employer
(H0(s) < 0). From equation (4)thisis
(9)Pr(U1)=
Pr(u1> -X0G1, u2 < —X0G2)
The second event is that the worker is nonunion and currently desires
union representation. The probability of this event is derived from
equations (5)and(7) as
(10) Pr(U=O, VFU=i)=
Pr(u1> —X0G1, u2 > —X0G2, u3 > —XG1)
÷ Pr(u1 < -X0G1, u3 > _XGi)
Thefirst term represents the joint probability that the worker is nonunion
because he desired a union job but was not hired and that the worker
curntly deires a inion jobThe second ter'i represent the jcint
probability that the worker is nonunion because he did not desire a union job
at the time he started his job and that he currently desires a union job.
The final event is that the worker is nonunion and currently does not
desire union representation. The probability of this event is derived from
equations (5) and (7) as
(ii)Pr(U=0, ITFU=0) =Pr(u1> -X0G1, u2 > —X0G2, u3 < —X0G1)
+ Pr(u1< —X0G1, u3 < —XG1)
Thefirstterm represents the joint probability that the worker is nonunion
becausehe desired a union job but was not hired by a union employer and that-15— Henry S. Farber
he currently does not desire union representation. The second term
represents the joint probability that the worker is nonunion because he did
not desire union representation at the time he started his job and that he
currently does not desire union representation.
The three probabilities defined in equations (9) through (ii)
appropriately account for the union status of a particular worker along with
his current preference for union representation where it is observed.
Identification is clearly aided by the asswnption that the parameters of the
model which determines worker preferences at the start of the job are the
sameasthe parameters of the model which determines current preferences
(c).Thisis a prior theoretical restriction which provides "real"
identification of the model and does not rely unduly on the functional form
of the probability distribution. It is interesting to note that censored
data models are generally estimated in order to obtain consistent estimates
of the parameters of the censored process, while in this case the censored
data are used to help identify and estimate the parameters of the censoring
process.
Although the parameters of the model are fixed over time, the framework
allows considerable flexibility in preferences over time. This comes from
two sources. The first is that the unobserved components in worker
preferences at the start of the job (u1) and currently (u3) can and likely do
differ while the real possibility of correlation is allowed for. The second
source of flexibility comes from the fact that the exogenous variables can
change over time. In the empirical work which follows, the major time-.
varying variables are age and seniority.1 Overall, the framework allows
fluctuations over time in both the measured and unmeasured characteristics of
workers and their jobs to have effects on worker preferences for union—16- Henry S. Farber
representation. These effects are consistent with the theoretical framework
while at the same time preserving the fundamental identificationof the
model.
IV.ESTIMATION
The log—likelihood function for the trivariate censored data modelis
defined using equations (9) through (ii) as
(12) L ={U11nPr(u1 > -X01G1, u2 < -x0.G2)
+
(1—U.)VFU.ln{pr(u1> —X1G1, u2 > -X01G2,u3 > _X0Gi)
+ Pr(u1< -X0G1,u3
>—X.G1 )J





where i indexes observations. The dichotomous variableU1 equals one for
union workers and is zero otherwise, and the dichotomous variable
VFU equals
one if the worker responded to the VFU question affirmatively and iszero
otherwise. The likelihood function and its derivativesare composed of
univariate, bivariate, and trivariate normal cumulative distribution
functions which, while they cannot be evaluated in closedform, can be
approximated numerically to the required accuracy. The likelihood function
was maximized numerically with respect to G1, G2, and the three correlations
between u1, u2, and u3 using the algorithm described byBerndt, Hall, Hall,
and Hausman [3]. This was a process which consumedlarge amounts of
computational resources but was not marked by any particular difficulty in
convergence. Various starting values were used to ensure convergence toa
consistent set of parameters.-1?-- Henry S. Farber
The maximum likelihood estimates of the paraineLers are contained in
Table II. The value of the log—likelihood function at the maximum is —897.2.
This is compared to a log—likelihood value for a constrained model with two
parameters which represent constant probabilities of observing a worker in
each of the three possible states of —983.3. This model embodies twenty—
eight constraints on the structural model and can be rejected using a
likelihood ratio test at any reasonable level of significance. This suggests
that the model explains a significant portion of the variation in the data.
Table II also contains estimates of a simple univariate probit model of
the union status of workers using the same variables as the queuing model.
The time dependent variables are measured at the start of the workers'
current jobs. These estimates are included simply as an illustration of the
conventional approach to estimating models of union status determination, and
they are best interpreted as indicative of the partial correlations between
the exogenous variables and union status.
It is clear from the estimates in Table II that two of the three
estimated correlao:is ar estimafed very imp-'ecisely. These are the
correlation (p12) between the errors in the start—of—job worker preference
equation and in the employer selection equation and the correlation (p23)
between the errors in the current worker preference equation and in the
employer selection equation. This suggests that the likelihood function is
very flat in these dimensions, which implies that there is little information
in the data regarding whether workers who are more likely on the basis of
their unobservable attributes to desire union representation are more or less
likely to be hired by union employers. Further evidence for this is that
when two versions of the model which constain these correlations were
estimated, the results did not change substantially. The first special caseTABLE II








































in L —897.2 —546.3
The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. The basegroup












12 < Ed < 16
Ed16
Age
Sen-18- Henry S. Farber
was to impose the constraint that p12p23 so that the correlations between
the unobservables affecting worker and employer preferences are time
invariant. The maximum log—likelihood value of this model was —897.3 which
implies using a likelihood ratio test that it is not possible to reject the
constraint at any reasonable level of significance. The second special case
was to impose the double constraint that p12 p230 so that the
unobservables affecting worker and employer preferences are uncorrelated.
Themaximumlog-likelihood value for this model was —897.3 which again
implies using a likelihood ratio test that the constraint cannot be rejected
at any reasonable level of significance. The estimates of the other
parameters of the model are virtually unchanged, although the precision with
which they are estimated is improved somewhat by the imposition of the
constraints. Nonetheless, to be conservative, the discussion of the results
will focus on the estimates obtained for unconstrained model and contained in
Table II.
The remaining correlation (p13) between the unobservable factors
nffecting worker 'weferences et .if'erent points in tine is asymptotically
significantly greater than zero at conventional levels. This is consistent
with the expectation that there are unmeasured attributes of jobs and workers
which affect preferences for union representation and which persist over
time.
V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
The estimates of contained in Table II reflect variation in worker
preferences for unionization. In particular, the probability that a worker
desires union representation is Pr(u1 > —xG1) so that a positive coefficient
on a variable in XG1 implies that workers with higher values of that variable—19- Henry S. Farber
are more likely to desire union representation. Similarly, the estimates of
G2 reflect variation in the propensity of union employers to hire particular
workers. The probability that a given worker will be hired by a union
employer is Pr(u2 < —XG2) so that a positive coefficient on a variable in XG2
implies that workers withhighervalues of that variable are lesslikelyto
findunion employment.
The estimates of the simple probit model ofunionstatus determination
contained in Table IIhighlights a number of interesting empirical
rel
hips. Chief among these are that nonwhites are more likely while
sou' rlworkers less likely to be union workers. In addition, older workers
are less likely to be unionized while blue collar workers are significantly
more likely to be unionized than any of the other three occupational
groupings. These results, while typical, are not easily interpreted with
regard to the behavior of workers or employers. For example, the fact that
southern workers are less likely to be unionized does not provide any
information regarding the extent to which this is a result of less preference
for union 'ep'esentation on th part of workers as opposed to a. relative lack
of supply of union jobs.
The estimates of the queuing model of union status determination can be
used to resolve these behavioral issues. The important quantities are the
probability that a worker desires union representation (Pr(DES1)), the
probability that a worker who desires union representation will be hired by a
union employer (Pr(HIRE1 J DES 1), and the probability that a worker is
unionized (Pr(U1)). These probabilities are easily constructed from the
parameter estimates as-20- Henry S. Farber
Pr(DES1) Pr(u1 > —XG1);
Pr(U=1) =Pr(DES=1,HIRE=1),
(13) =
Pr(u1> —XG1,u2 < —XG2 );and
P HIRE-1 DES-i -Pr(U1) — - / —
Pr(DES=1'
wherethe last relationship follows from application of Bayes' Law and where
Pr(HIREl) =Pr(u2< -xa2). Note that by itself the probability that a
worker will be hired by a union employer (Pr(HIRE1)) does not have a clear
interpretation because it does not account for whether or not the particular
worker is even interested in a union job. The relevant decision from the
union employer's standpoint is which workers to hire from the oo1rkers
who desire union representation. In this context the quantity
Pr(HIRE=lDES=1) measures the ability of a worker to be hired by a union
employer, and it reflects (inversely) the extent to which there are queues
for vacancies in existing union jobs.
The parameter estimates will be discussed considering the effect of one
variable at a time for a thirty year old worker in the base group consisting
of white sing.e m'.le blue collar onsouthern workers with twelve years of
education and zero seniority. The first row of Table III contains the
probabilities defined in equation (13) computed for a worker in the base
group using the parameter estimates contained in Table II for the queuing
model. The predicted probability of unionization based on the simple probit
model is also presented for the purpose of comparison. The asymptotic
standard errors contained in this and succeeding tables are approximations
based on a first order expansion of the relevant function around the
estimated parameter values and, as such, they are constructed using the
entire covariance structure of the parameters.TABLE III








































The numbers in parentheses are approximate asymptotic standard errors derived
from a first order expansion of the relevant function around the estimated
parameter values contained in Table II. The Base group consists of thirty
year old, white, single, male, blue collar workers with twelve years
education who live outside the south and who have no seniority.-21- Henry S. Farber
Table III also contains the predicted probabilities for otherwise
observationally equivalent nonwhite and southern workers. Thesecondhalf of
'the table contains the differences between the predicted probabilities for
nonwhites and southerners and those for workers in the base group along with
the asymptotic standard errors of these differences.
It is clear from the estimated probabilities in Table III that nonwhite
workers are significantly more likely to be working on a union job. This
result is found both with the queuing model and with the simple probit model.
The results using the queuing model suggest that differential between
nonwhites and whites in their probability of unionization is due almost
entirely to the significantly higher probability of nonwhites of desiring
union representation. Quantitatively, nonwhites have a probability of
desiring union representation which is approximately 45 percent higher (25.6
percentage points) than that for observationally equivalent whites. At the
same time the conditional probability of a nonwhite being hired by a union
employer given that he desires union representation is not significantly
diff'nt at conventional levels from that for whites. Thus, the effective
"length" of the queue for union jobs does not seem to differ significantly by
race.
The results contained in Table III highlight sharp distinctions which
emerge on the basis of region. Using the estimates of both the queuing model
and the simple probit model, southern workers are significantly less likely
to be working on union jobs than are observationally equivalent nonsouthern
workers. The results using the queuing model suggest that this difference is
due to two factors. First, southern workers are significantly less likely to
desire union representation. The second factor is that the conditional
probability of a southern worker being hired by a union employer given that-22- Henry S. Farber
he desires a union job is significantly and substantially (26 per cent) lower
than that for nonsouthern workers. In other words, despite the fact that
southern workers demand somewhat less unionization, the length of the queue
for union jobs relative to demand is much longer in the south than outside
that region. This no doubt reflects supply constraints on union jobs which
may be due to a social and legal climate (typified by Right-to-Work laws
common in the South) which makes union organizing and administration in the
South more difficult and expensive than outside that region.
Table IV contains the predicted probabilities defined in equation (13)
for base group workers in the various occupational groups. The differences
in these probabilities for each occupational group relative to blue collar
workers are also presented. It is clear that workers in each of the three
occupational groups including clerical, service, and professional and
technical workers are significantly and substantially less likely than blue
collar workers to be working on union jobs. While no distinction can be
drawn among the first three groups based on the simple probit results, some
inter€sting distirv'ti.on can be drawn using the queuing model. These are
discussed in turn.
Clerical workers are significantly less likely than blue collar workers
to desire union representation. At the same time clerical workers who desire
union representation are significantly less likely to be hired by a union
employer than are blue collar workers who desire union representation. In
other words the queue for union jobs is relatively longer for clerical
workers than for blue collar workers. This may reflect higher costs of
organizing among clerical workers as a result of market conditions or
employer resistance. The conclusion to be drawn is that clerical workers are
less likely to be unionized than blue collar workers as a result of bothTABLE IV


































































The numbers in parentheses are approximate asymptotic standard errors derived
from a first order expansion of the relevant function around the estiaated
parameter values contained in Table II. All workers are thirty year old
white, single, and male with twelve years of education who live outside the
south and have zero seniority.—23-- HenryS. Farber
a lower desire for union representation and a relative inability to translate
demand for union representation into a union job.
Service workers show a somewhat different pattern. Service workers do
not differ significantly from blue collar workers in their desire for union
representation. The relatively low extent of unionization among service
workers is largely due to a significantly and substantially (29 per cent)
lower probability of being hired by a union employer conditional on desiring
a union job. Again, this relatively long queue, which reflects supply
constraints on the number of union jobs, may be the result of higher costs of
creating new union jobs as a result of market conditions or employer
resistance. Simply put, service workers are less unionized than blue collar
workers largely as a result of an inability to be hired by a union employer
in spite of an equivalent demand for union jobs.
At the other extreme, professional and technical worker are
significantly less likely to desire union representation than are blue collar
workers. However, there is at best a weak difference between the
probabilities of heitg hiredby a inion employer conditional on desiring a
union job for professional and. technical workers and for blue collar
workers. In other words, the queues for union jobs are of relatively the
samelengthfor professional and technical workers and for blue collar
workers. The conclusion to be drawn is that the lower probability of
unionization of professional and technical workers is largely due to a lower
desire for union representation.
Table V contains the predicted probabilities defined in equation (13)
for workers in the base group of various ages. The differences in these
probabilities for workers of various ages are also presented. It is clear onTABLE V
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The numbers in parentheses are approximate asymptotic standard errors derived
from a first order expansion of the relevant function around the estimated
parameter values contained in Table II. All workers are white single male
blue collar workers with twelve years of education who live outside the south
and have zero seniority.-24- Henry S. Farber
the basis of both the queuing model results and the simple probit results
that older workers are significantly less likely to be unionized.
Examination of the results of the queuing model yields the conclusion that
this is due to a significantly lower probability of desiring union
representation on the part of older workers. A contributing factor may be
that older workers have a lower probability of being hired by a union
employer conditional on desiring a union job. However, this latter
conclusion must be interpreted with caution due to the fact that the
hypothesis that there is no difference in this conditional probability by age
can be rejected at best at the ten percent level using an asymptotic t—test.
On its face the result that older workers are less likely to desire union
representation seems to contradict the notion that union employers provide
more fringe benefits, such as pensions, which ought to be valued more by
older workers than do nonunion employers.15 However, this result is
consistent with evidence presented by Farber and Saks [8], based on an
entirely different data set, which shows a similar inverse relationship
behieen age end wokcr preferences for uilion representation.
Nonunion seniority can affect only the desire for union representation
in this model. Workers with more nonunion seniority are significantly less
likely to desire union representation than are workers with less nonunion
seniority. To illustrate this, the probability that a worker in the base
group with no nonunion seniority at age 40 desires union representation is
.531,whilethe same probability for an otherwise equivalent worker with 10
years seniority is .429. The difference between these probabilities is .102
with an asymptotic standard error of .068. Note that the result refers to
the effect of seniority on the desire for union representation on the current-25- Henry S. Farber
job so that it is not caused by a reluctance of high seniority nonunion
workers to quit their jobs in order to take union jobs.
The remaining set of variables relates to the educational attainment,
sex, and marital status of workers. No systematic patterns emerge from the
estimates regarding the relationship between these variables and the process
by which the union status of workers is determined.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study a model of the determination of the union status of
workers was developed which differs substantially from the standard worker
choice model. The decisions of both workers and potential union employers
were incorporated in the model, recognizing the possibility of an excess
supply of workers for existing union jobs. In this context, workers make
explicit decisions regarding their desire for union representation which do
not necessarily result in employment on a union job. Only if the worker is
hired by a union employer out of the queue of workers who desire union
res6ntatioa wil fte worker9s ;referenc actual'Ly result in unionization.
This theoretical framework results in an empirical problem of partial
observability because data on union status are not sufficient to determine
whether nonunion workers are nonunion because they do not desire union
representation or because they were not hired by a union employer despite
their preference for such a job.
In order to solve this problem without relying unduly on distributional
assumptions for identification, a rather unique data set from the Quality of
Employment Survey (QES) was used. These data contain information that, for
nonunion workers, provides information on their current preferences for union-26- HenryS.Farber
representation. Using these data, a trivariate econometric model which
accounts for the censored natue of these data as well as for the union
status of workers was derived explicitly from the theoretical framework.
This empirical specification embodies the separate decisions of workers and
potential union employers regarding the determination of the union status of
workers.
The empirical results yield some interesting insights into the process
of union status determination which cannot be learned from a simple probit or
logit analysis of unionization. Chief among these relate to unionization of
nonwhites and southerners. The well-known fact that nonwhites are more
likely to be unionized compared to otherwise equivalent whites was found
largely to be the result of a greater preference for union representation.
The equally well-known lower propensity to be unionized among southern
workers was found to be due to a combination of a somewhat lower demand for
union representation on the part of workers and a supply of unionized jobs
which is substantially more constrained than outside the South relative to
deinnrd. The lotger queues in tl'.e Sovth for vacancies in existiip union jobs
implied by the latter result are attributed to higher costs of organization
and administration of labor unions in the South. Other dimensions along
which the results interpreted in the context of the model yielded behavioral
insights include occupational status and age.
The model and estimates presented here have important implications for
measuring the true effect of unions (as opposed to the union-nonunion
differential) on such quantities as wages, turnover, and productivity. The
wealth of studies (surveyed and critiqued by Freeman and Nedoff [io]) that
attempt to estimate this true effect rely on econometric techniques which-27-- Henry S. Farber
posit that union status is determined through a single equation/single
decision—maker process. To the extent thatthisprocess isinadequately
modeled, the estimates ofthetrue effects of unionswhich rely onthem will
be misleading.
To be more explicit, consider the example of the widely used Mills'
ratio technique presented by Heckman [ii] to correct for sample selection
bias. This technique proceeds on the assumption that the log of wages, for
example, is distributed normally and that union status can be modeled as
determined by a simple probit. Under the assumption of joint normality of
the errors, estimates can be derived for the mean of the error(s) in the wage
equation(s) conditional on union status as a function of the reduced form
probit estimates on union status. These estimated conditional means are the
basisof the correction of the union—nonunion differential to yield estimates
of the true effect of unions. This correction is crucially dependent on a
range of assumptions, not the least of which is that union status can be
modeled correctly as a simple univariate probit. If this particular
asuuinption fails, bhen the conditiJ)al means of the wage functions will have
a different form from that derived from a simple probit so that the
correction will be unreliable.
It should be clear from the results of this study that the determination
of union status cannot be modeled adequately as a simple probit and that an
approach to estimating the true effects of unions consistent with the model
developed .here would be preferable. Unfortunately, the data problems
outlined above make implementation of this model for such purposes difficult.
As far as can be determined, only the QES has the data required to estimate
the model, and previous experience with estimating union and nonunion wage-28- Henry S. Farber
equations using these data is not typical of similar experience with more
widely used data sources such as the Current Population Survey or the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics.16 A topic for future research is the development
of techniques for estimating models of the sort presented here which use data
solely on union status and which do not rely to an undue extent on the
functional form of the error distribution for identification.
Nassachusetts Institute of Technology September 1982-29- Henry S. Farber
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2. See Freeman and Medoff [10] for an interesting summary of this
literature as well as a critique from a unique perspective.
3.Thisanalysis is not applicable to industries, such as construction,
where hiring is controlled by the union through a hiring hail. Workers
in such industries are excluded from both the theoretical and empirical
analyses throughout.
4.Raisian[16] investigates the issue of the magnitude of union dues
relative to the union—nonunion wage differential.
5. The particular set of institutions described here refer to private
sector nonagricultural and nonmanagerial workers in the United States
who are covered by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Organization of workers not covered by the NLRA proceeds along
different, but equally costly and uncertain, lines.
6. It is possible for union jobs to revert to nonunion status through an
NLRB-supervised decertification election. However, these are relatively
rare and can safely be ignored in this analysis. For example, according
to the NLRB [13], during fiscal 1979 7266 certification elections
involving 538,404 workers were officially decided while only 777-32-- Henry S. Farber
decertification elections involving 39,538 workers were officially
decided.
7. In states with Right-to-Work laws, new hirees cannot be forced to join
the union or pay dues, but they do share in any benefits of
unionization. This issue will be raised again in interpreting the
empirical results.
8. The foregoing analysis is considerably complicated by recognition that
certain individual characteristics which affect skill level are
determined at least in part through investment decisions made by the
individual. However, explicit consideration of this factor is beyond
the scope of this study, and the current assumptions that individual
characteristics are determined exogenously to union status is sufficient
for the problem at hand.
9. In the union sector compensation is determined through the collective
bargaining process where market and other factors serve as constraints.
It is beyond the scope of this study to model the determination of the
ompensation3chedu.e nthe ix.iion sector, though a major factor along
withlabor market forces is likely to be the internal political
processesof the union. See the Webbe [19], Ross [17], and Dunlop
[4] for early discussions of market and political forces in the
determination of union bargaining goals. Farber [5] develops and
estimates a simple voting model of union wage determination.
10. The assumption of a zero mean is neutral due to the presence of constant
terms in the parameter vectors which capture the mean unobserved effect.
11. These models have been estimated in this context using samples from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics in excess of 1500 observations and from
the Current Population Survey in excess of 19,000 observations.-33- Henry S. Farber
12. See Quinn and Staines [15] for a detailed description of the survey
design.
13. A more cumbersome notation would define u as uand u and u- in 3 ic I
equations [ii and [2] as u10 and u respectively.
14. Other variables, such as marital status, which can change over time are
assumed not to vary due to lack of information on such variation.
15. See Freeman [9] for an empirical analysis of the relationship between
unionization and fringe benefits.
16. See Farber [6].